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'C'P.E SUPRE"!B CIJUT<T 0"' TllE STATf: 'iF' UTAH
-ooo-

RU-;ISTI:n.cD !:'EYSICAL
Tl!E'U\P I S':'S, I:'C. , a

Utah corporation,
PlaintiffRes?ondent,
vs.

!(OBERT

!~.

JEPSOJJ,

DefendantAppellant.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case '!o. 15395

B'l.IEP OF R!.SDr:r:mE:!TS

STATE'IENT Or 'i'Hr: [F\'l''JRf: OF THE CASB
This is an action brought by Registered Physical
Therapists for dar1ages for breacl-t of a fiouciar" duty and for
destruction of its business arising out of T(ohert K. Jepson's
nalicious and intentional acts.
DI SPOSI'rii)c! I'l TJ!E L0\7ET( COU 0 .T
Beginning on '·lav 26th, 1977, this case lvns tried 1·1ithout
a jury before the Honorable non V. Tibbs.

The LoHer r:ourt l"ound

t'lnt an cm!'lo;'er-el'1nlovc:>e relationshin existed bet~>reen respondent,
Re0istercd P~ysical 'C'he~apists (RPm) and appellant, Robert ~.
JeJ~on

(Jenson), under an e1'1nloyr1ent agreerent and that Jepson

not onl~· breached se1id agreerent but also breacherl his fiduciarv
duties e1s e1n cl'1plo'/CL' .-.nd "laliciuusly and intentionally converted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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business.

Jud'}ment including punitive damages was grantee

against Jespon totalling a value of $'32,315.00.

'"~.PT

was a: ..

awarded as additional punitive damages all credits and of:,:
due to Jepson from RPT.

RELIEF S0UGHT

0~

APPEAL

Respondent seeks an affirmation of the finf.ings and
conclusions of the Lower Court and the judgment therein,
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ST_l\.TI::MENT OF FACTS
A.

Rule 75

(p)

(2) Statement.

Appellant, Jepson, has set forth in its brief a statement of facts.
RPT,

In compliance with Rule 75

(p}

(2), respondent,

indicates below to what extent appellant's

statement is

inconsistent with the facts.
1.

Respondent agrees with

~ost

of appellants first

and second paragraphs on page 2; however, there was a specific
verbal employment agreement that contained specific terms which
are hereinafter stated in respondent's statement of facts.
2.

Respondent agrees with most of

paragraph on page 2 except

a~pellant

a~pellant's

third

failed to mention that he

advised RPT in November 1975 not only that he was terminating
but that he was going to keep all the equipment (Exhibit PL 13,
TR 105~

As a response to Jepson's notification, Don Vernon and

Larry Brown, officers of RPT, Hent to Richfield on December 9,
1975, to mal:e preparations to continue their physical therapy
business and secure the personal property of' RP':'.

('!.'R 106)

It was only after Vernon and BroHn discovered that Jepson had
removed all important and necessary information and documents
needed to continue ~PT's business in Richfield that they secured
their equipment.

(TR 107-110, 113)

RPT did not permanently

close their Richfiel~ business or bank account at that time.
( TR 11 () ,

112- 114
3.

&

15 4 )

Appellant's fourth paragraph of his statement of
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facts appearing on page 3 is correct except for the additional
fact stated by Don Vernon that if the equip~ent
the off ice could be operated
4.

tl1e

brought ba:

same as b e f ore.

(Tr 154)

Appellant's fifth and sixth paragraphs of his sta:.

ment of facts appearing on pages 3 and 4 are somev1hat correct,
however, all of Jepson's efforts were done as an employee of
RPT and it was only with the financial assistance of RPT that
any good will was acquired.

B.

(Tr 317)

Respondent's Statement of Facts.
l.

Jepson was employed by RPT from August 1973 throu:,

December 9, 1975, to conduct and operate '{I'T's physical
business in Richfield, Utah,

thera~

(Findings No. 1, Tr 57)

2.

The terms of the employment agreement were as foL

a.

That plaintiff would provide all of the finaociM

and pay for all expenses to establish a physical therapy busi·
(Tr 60-63, Exhibit PL-13, Findings

in Richfield, Utah.
b.

~lo.

That the plaintiff would pay for all expenses

incurred by the Richfield operation until sufficient funds,.,,~
deposited in the Richfield checking account fran services ~e~·
formed in Richfield to pay for said expP.nses.
PL-13, Findings i'lo.

c.

2

(b)

(Tr 60-63, r:x>:.

)

That defendant Hould receive a beginning salar;·:

·
and further recei"'
$700.00 to manage the Richfield operat1on
costs of living increases in said salary.

(Tr 57-59, Findi'
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d.

That defendant would receive, to begin with, 10%

of the net profit generated by the ~ichfield operation and that
said percentage would increase by 5% increments every quarter
until defendant's share of the profits reached 50%.

(Tr 65-70,

Findings No. 2 (d)
e.

That 10% of the gross income placed on the books of

the Richfield operation would go to
development of corporate business.
(e)

plaintif~'s corporation for

(Tr 65-66, Findings

:~o.

2

)

f.

That on the sales of all items from the Richfield

operation including corsets and appliances defendant would
receive 70% of the net profit plus 20% in the event said items
were not purchased through an independent jobber and plaintiff
would receive 10% of the net profit on all sales.
Findings no. 2 (f)
g.

(Tr 73-74,

)

That plaintiff would furnish all of the initial

equipment to begin the physical therapy business in ~ichfield,
Utah.

Tr 61, Findings No. 2 (g)
3.

)

RPT fully performed under all of the terms of said

agreement but Jepson breached said agreement as follo~TS:

a.

Paid to himself RPT's share of the profits from

sales of items in Richfield.
b.

(Findings No. 5, Tr 86-87)

Used corporate funds for his own personal use.

(Findings No. 6, Tr 90-92)

c.

l~ithdrew monies from RPT's account for profit sharing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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4.

On November 26, 1975, Jepson notified RPT that

was terminating his employment
and keeping
RPT's equ·lpment :··
'

I

(Exhibit PL-18)

himself.
5.

On December 9,1975, Vernon and Brown, officers:'

RPT, went to Richfield to straighten out the problem of the
equipment and if necessarv run RP~'s office in ~ichfield.
6.

RPT was unable to continue its physical therapy

business in Richfield

(Tr 110)

for the reason that Jepson ha:
1

not only breached his fiduciary duty as an employee, but als:
had destroyed RPT' s business by comrni tting the following
cious and intentional acts:
a.

(Findin<Js No.

~aL·

9)

Destroyed or converted to his own use active tres·

ment cards and other materials containing confidential in(or
tion about 'l.PT's customers.
b.

Ot)ened his own checking account and deposited FY

monies therein.
c.

(Tr 108-110, 113)

(Tr 26-27)

Prior to his termination date he kept RPT's con·

fidential information,

to-wit,

treatment cards, accounts

receivables, daily worksheets and transferred said confide:.:.
information to his own treament cards.

Shortly thereafter

destroyed ~PT's materials; collect )7,999.00 of '1.PT's accw·
receivables and converted said money to his own use; kept
other accounts receivables of RPT; and solicited and contir. ..
to treat custoners of ::PT.

(Tr 28-3~,

278-279, r:xhibit D·l'

Sponsored D-31)
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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7.

Jepson converted all of RPT's physical therapy

business in Richfield, Utah to h;s
b
·
• own us~ness and subsequently
grossed $60,000

in 1976 from said business.

(Findings No. 13,

Tr 35-36)
B.

In approximately February, 1976, RPT finally decided

that they could not continue their business in Richfield due to
the loss of necessary information to Jepson and the head start
he received to solicit patients of RPT.
9.

(Tr 113-114)

The RPT's Richfield physical therapy business had

earned the following net profits:
1974 - $6,945.32

(Exhibit D-26)

1975- $1,748.45
(Exhibit D-27, PL-12
(Does not include December)
ARGUHENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S APPEAL FOR LEGAL RELIEF LI'UTS THIS COURTS
SCOPE OF ti.EVIEW.
It is a well settled law in Utah that this court, in
cases at law tried before the court without a jury, 1vill only
examine evidence as is necessary to determine question of law.
Further, this court will not pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify the findings or lUdgment, or substitute
another evalutation of the evidence, unless there is no
legitimate proof to support the findings or judgmnet.

In

no cases at law, either with or without a jury, will this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court determine questions of fact, but may in enul·ty
.,
cases.
Lyman v. Town of Price,

63 Utah 90,

222 P. 599; Sine

11

-

Salt Lake Transoort Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P. 2d 875; Pixto~
Dunn,

120 Utah 658, 238 P. 2d 408; and Article VIII section,

of Utah Constitution.
Since under Utah law both actions at law and actions.
equity can be consolidated in one action it is sometiMes dif:.
cult to ascertain whether the case on appeal is one of equit;
or law.

Such is not the case here for it is clearly evid~~

that the relief sought on ap':)eal by a!:)pellant is legal relie'
from damages awarded for a breach of fiduciarv duty and desc:
tion of respondent's business.

Respondent did not seek

eqUJ~

relief in the lower court and appellant does not seek it in t'.
court.

Further, the distinction as to whether leoal relief

sought rather than equitable is mentioned in 27 Am Jur 2d S'
112 at page 637 where it states:
" .•. That the suit is held to be judicable at law,
and not in equity, where the purpose thereof is t~
recoverv of da.'11ages which have been sustained bv
reason of fraud' a fraudulent conspiracy or a breac.
of a fiduciary duty."
(See

also

~'11bler

v. Choteau,

556 and Koeon v. Corpeiro,

107

us 586, 27

L ed 322, S ct

200 A2d 708.)

Appellant is seeking relief from damages sustainec:
a breaci1 of a fiduciary duty and this kind of relief is clec'
legal relief and as such linits the scope of revie1>1 on o?s::
Sponsored
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Appellant presents two issues to this court.

0ne is

whether the lower court's award of $10,000 was in conforMity
with its findings.

The other issue is \olhether there was any

legitimate evidence to support the figure of $10,000.

This

court is not required to review the evidence and make its
inferences therefrom, however, respondent submits that the
evidence and the inferences therefrom clearly support the
findings and the lower court's judgment

\~hich

with its findings and should not be disturbed.

was

in conformity

("lason v. 'lason,

160 P. 2d 730 [1945))
POINT II
THE 11.r·IARD OF DN-ti\GES FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS i·IAS Hl COClFORrliTY \liTH THE TRIAL COURT'S Fii<DING THAT JEPSON BB.EACHF.D HIS
F IDUC LII.RY DUTIES AS AC-1 EHPL0YEE OF RPT.

Appellant urges upon this court the argument that since
there was no written agreement between Jepson and RPT an award
for loss of business could not he founded in contract.

However,

some courts have read into the ~~ploYMent at will at least a
contractual obligation to perform services for the best interest
of the employer and that where a key employee acts to the detriment
of his ~~player prior to the tine that he terminates gives rise
to a cause of action founded upon breach of fiduciary duty.

This

fiduciary duty arises out of the e~~loyer-employee relationship
and is present in all employment contracts whether .,.,ritten or
oral as an implied covenant.
stated in

C.E.I.R.,

Concerning this duty the court

Inc. v. CoMputer DynaMics Corn., 229 M.D.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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357, 183 A. 2d 374 at 380, "that any breach o f an employee',
fiduciary duty to the employer will entitle the employer to

an accounting in equity for the fruits of the wrongful actic·
Further,

in Restatement of Aaency it clearly s~~s:

in an employer-employee relationship:
" ••• after the termination of the agency, unless
otherwise agreed, the agent has no duty not to
compete with the principal; however, during t~e
continuance of the agencv, an agent has a duty not ::
to do disloyal acts looking to future cor.1petition .. :
Restatement of Agencv 2d §396, Comment: (a)
The court in State Export Co. v. 11ol Shioping > Tnc.

155 NY S 2d 188, also stated a similar rule of law:
" ..• a former employee is not free to exploit the
trade of his former employer if the op~ortunity
is facilitated by acts of preparation and disloyalty during his employment and before resignation, and by the breach of his obligation to use
his best efforts in the interest of the employer;
and that if the opportunity acquired after resignation is the opportunity lost to the employer
because of disloyal acts done during the emplo]'ll\ent,
the loss is actionable."
It is not necessary to argue that Jepson's oral
employment contract contained an implied covenant of loyal:·
and good faith for the law is clear that a fiduciarv duty
and a breach of this duty is actionable whether it is clas':'
in contract or tort.
The lower court found numerous disloyal acts done:·
tionally and maliciously by Jepson looking to future

com~e::

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The opportunity of treating patients in Richfield that Jepson
received and RPT lost was a direct result of J epson • s d'~s 1 oyal
acts while employed.

All of the information necessary for the

operation of the Richfield business belonged to RPT and the
destruction and conversion of said information by Jepson was
not only an actionable wrong as a breach of his fiduciary duty
but the proximate cause of the damages suffered by RPT.
Numerous cases have awarded damages for similar breaches of
fiduciary duties.

(28 ALR 3d § 24, p. 120)

The critical factor for which damages have been awarded
has been the existence of intentional acts committed by employees
while still employed, looking for future competition, that were
not consistent with the employees obligation to

exercise the

utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of their duties.

A case on point is Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, Inc., v. Hall, 18
Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89 (1969) where officers, while still
employed by the corporation,committed acts to secure and solicit
customers of the corporation for their new and

com~eting

business.

This court stated that a duty of loyalty is required of officers
(employees) and then cited with approval Duane Jones Comoany,
Inc. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E. 2d 237

(1954) where, in a

similar set of facts, the court also awarded damages for lost
profits.

Although the acts of the defendants in these two

cases are somewhat different than the acts of Jepson in the
present case many similarities exist.

The major similarity is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the result obtained.

The court in Duane Jones, supra, p.):

stated as follows:
" ... that the individual defendants-appellants ,
employees of plaintiff corporation, determined' u~;:
a course of conduct which, when subsecruently c~r~ 1 ,
o~t, resulted 1n benefit to themselves through~~
t1on of plaintiff's business, in violation of t~e
fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing ir:
on defendants by their close relationship with pla ..
corporation."
Appellant further attempts to argue that if the fou:.
for the award of dama0es cannot be squeezed into contract:
only has one alternative left and that is the tort of taki:
customer list which constitutes a trade secret.

By attemc:

to limit the alternatives appellant hopes to dismiss his L
However,

the law allows other alternatives, as

mention~~

and the finding by the lower court of Jepson's breach of a
fiduciary duty would be sufficient to support an award

o!~

for loss of business.
Hot only can the lower court's award of damages

:c

loss of business be founded in contract and agency law as
mentioned above but a strong position can be presented for
foundation in tort law based upon the taking of confiden::
information.

Respondent agrees with the cases cited in

appellant's brief and the fact that Jepson had the right~
compete and solicit custor1ers or patients of P.PT after Je;'
termination as an employee.

The tortious destructions o'.

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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business was not caused solely by the subsequent competition
and solicitation by Jepson, but the malicious acts done prior
to termination that rendered PYT incapable of competing at all.
Jepson was under a fiduciary obligation to conduct himself so
as to not cause injuries to RPT, and not to take documents and
information belonging to RPT.
Appellant in his brief stresses the fact that most
courts do not protect customer names and addresses unless they
are considered confidential information.

However, in none of

the cases cited by appellant has a court condoned or allowed
the taking of personal property of the em?loyer Hhich contained
information necessary for the employer to conduct its business.
An excellent case on point is Southern California Disinfecting
Co. v. Lamkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal Rptr. 43 (1960),
where the defendant while employed as a route salesman removed
from a route book sheets containing information on plaintiff's
customers.

The defendant replaced the sheets taken with blank

sheets and then after his termination used the infomation on
the sheets taken to solicit customers of the plaintiff before
plaintiff could again acquire the lost information necessary
to deal with its customers.

The court held that such conduct

by Lamkin amounted to "stealthy connivance to pirate business
unfairly" and awarded danages for loss of business and punitive
damages.

The court also held that the information taY.en was

confidential information.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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71 A 802, where an employee who examined eyes and prescribe-:
glasses for patrons of the employer copied names and addreso'
of customers from the records of the employer prior to leavi:
and then used said information to solicit their business fm
himself.

The court rejected the argument that copying and

using only those names of customers that the employee had
personally exar:1ined was not a breach of confidence,

and fur:

stated that an employee has no more right to copy records ma'
by himself for the employer than to copy other

records~~

he had access.
In the present case Jepson 1 s acts of taking of the t:•
ment cards and other information and transferring said info:r'
tion to his own cards and then destroying RPT's cardswere~
acts from which daf'lages flow.

Jepson's acts were a rnalicio:

effort to interfere with and destroy RPT 1 s business thus

!'lJ

~

it easier for Jepson to compete and acquire RPT' s business.
This court would be hard pressed to find a better exarn?le s'
disloylty and breach of a fiduciary duty, unfair cornt)etitic:
and tortious taking of confidential information.
POINT III
THERE TvAS ~10R!. THAN SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEF'OP.I: THE
TRIAL COURT TO SUPPORT THE

AWAP.~

IN THE SUM OF SlO,OOO

r~

PLAINTIFF'S LOSS OF BUSINESS.
It is well settled law that damaqes can be
loss of business.

award~-

The main problem that has a:Jpeared in rc·
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Sqid loss of business.

In 25 CJS, Damages, section 90, it

states:
"Where your regular and established business is
injured, interrupted or destroyed the measure of
damages is the diminution in value of the business
by reason of the wrongful act, with interest; it is
the net loss, and not diminution in gross income.
In order to establish the diminution in value, it
is necessary, or proper to show the usual, or past,
profits from the business."
It appears then, that the law suggests that the loss of
future profits from a regularly established business may in
proper cases be established by showing that the profits after
the wrong were less than past profits.
It is evident that RP'!'' s business in Richfield, Utah
a regular and established business.

There is also no contention

with the fact that the value of RP'l'' s Richfield business
diminished to zero subsequent to
intentional acts.

~ras

~ras

Jepson's malicious and

Further, the lower court found that said

acts of Jepson were the specific cause of the injury to and
the destruction of RPT' s business .in Richfield.

Therefore, the

only issue before this court in regards to the award of $10,000
is whether the trial court had sufficient evidence before it
to determine the value of RPT's Richfield business prior to its
destruction by Jepson.
The lower court had the following evidence before it to
establish the value of RPT's business in Richfield:
1.

The testimony of Don Vernon who was the president

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and major stockholder of RPT and the best qualified person
to know the value of said business.

He indicated that t~

of said business was Fifty Thousand Dollars

(Tr 131). !!is d',

mination of said value was based upon the actual profit str.
ture of said business during the three years ::,Jrior to its d',
tion, the amount of accounts receivable (placed in

evide~e

and Mr. Vernon 1 s own personal involvement with said busineo'
2.

The testimony of Robert Cameron, ?.PT 1 s accounk

who prepared all financial statements showing the profit or.
loss status of the Richfield business for the time

peri~

involved.
3.

The testimony of the defendant, Jepsor, who ind:::

that with essentially the same patients and referrals the L1
he took from RPT grossed $60,000 the following year.
4.

The best evidence before the trial court ';as

Exhibits D- 2 6, D- 27 and PL-12 which indica ted the exact an:
of profit earned by the subject business during the three:period ~rior to its destruction.
The aforesaid exhibits indicate that "PT made a ne:
profit in 1974 and 1975 of approximatelv $9,000.00, and
1 y ,<;"O
gross profit of approxFnate
' , 000 • 00 .

3

The net profit

is less than actual due to the unauthorized expenses incurr:
by

Je~son.

the lmver cou::
It is apparent from the record that
vale:
available evidence as to the

the
offor digitization
it all
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PYT's business in Richfield.

Said evidence established a

value a lot higher than $2,000.00 per year, but under the
general rule in the majority of the jurisdictions the trier
of the fact is not required to mathematical exactness in the
amount but only a reasonable approximation based upon the
evidence.

In U.S. v. Griffith, 210 F 2d 11, the Tenth Circuit

Court stated that
" ... althouqh persoective profits are somewhat uncertain
and problematical, in cases where damages are definitely
attributable to the wrong of the defendant and are only
uncertain as to amount, they will not te denied even
though they are difficult of ascertainment."
RPT contends that its prosepctive profits are not that uncertain
based upon the past performance of its business.

The court goes

on to state that in order for the trial court to reach a
reasonable approximation of future damages that have been lost
it must have such facts and circumstances before it to enable
it to make an estimate of damage based upon judgment not guess
work.

In the present case the trial court hau all the available

facts and circumstances upon which to make a reasonable approximation of the loss suffered by RPT due to the destruction of
their business.

The lower court did not use guess work to

arrive at the figure of 52,000.00 per year for the next five
years as the value of the lost business.

This figure represents

the lowest amount of net profit made in Richfield by RPT during
any one year and does not include any value for good will or
accounts receivable lost.

It is interesting to note that ~r.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Vernon, based his estimate of the value of RPT' s b USJ.ness
·
on
five year basis of $6,000.00 n. er year .cor
~
a total of $30,0o 0.
(Tr 131)
This court in Gould v. Mt. States Telephone and ':'elec:
309 p.

2d 802,

6 Utah 2nd 187 stated the true rule on the sut·

of determining damages from lost ?rof its.

This court stated.

page 806 as follov1s:
"Shall the injured party be allowed to recover no
damages (or merelv no!Tlinal), because he cannot sh01 1
the exact amount with certainty, thou<Jh he is readv
to show to the satisfaction of the jury, that he has
suffered large da"laqes bv the injury? Certaintv, it
is true, would lee thus attained; but it would be t~e
certainty of injustice. * * *Juries are allowed to ac:
upon probable and inferential as well as direct anct
positive proof.
1\nd 1-1hen, from the nature of t!1eca•·
the amount of the da!Clages cannot be estimated 1-1ith
certainty * * * 11e can see no objection to olacing
before the jury all the facts and circurnstances oft:.
case having any tendencv to show dal'lages, or their
orobable amount, so as to enable them to nake them~·
intelligible and ;-:>robable estiMate which the nature:
the case will admit."
RPT contends that the lower court had all of the facts a~
circumstances and made an intelligable and probable estiPate
as to the a!"'1ount of dal"'1a<Jes RPT suffered due to the destruc:
of their phvsical thera;-:>y business in ~ichfield, Utah.
Another case on :'oint is Vickers v. ''iichita ~
Univ.

518 P 2d 512, 213 Kansas 614, Hhere the court stated''

follOI'IS:
"unouestionabl'l the met'"lod of establishing the los'
nrofits with r~ason&ble certaintv is shm·!ing a his:c:
~f nast o~ofit ability.
Past nrofit al:ili~'l of~~:
ulai:- business is not, ho'·Jever, the onl:' :11ethod o: t'··
lost future ;:->rofit.
'The evJ.dence necess->rv J.n es ·
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~uture profits with reasonable certainty must depend
ln a_large measure upon the circumstances of a
partlcular case ... _absolute certainty in proving loss
of future prof1ts 1s not required ... "
In the Vickers

case the court reversed a lower court

decision to restrict the evidence of the plaintiff to past
business experience for the purpose of showing loss of profit
and allowed additional evidence as to what future ~rofits might
have been.

In the present case future profits can be and were

determined solely upon the past business experience of RPT.
This court made an i!"lportant point in the Gould case
where it stated th3.tthe rule againstthe recovery of uncertain
damages is generally directed against uncertainty with respect
to cause rather than to

~easure

or extent.

The lower court found

in the present case that there was no uncertainty as to the
cause of RPT's damage.

Their loss of business was directly

caused by the malicious and intentional acts of Jepson.

Appel-

lant argues that RPT should be denied recovery of damages for
loss of profit based solely on the uncertainty with respect
to the measure or extent of damages.

As was previously !"lentioned,

in regards to the measure or extent of damages, this court and
other courts have stated

that mathematical exactness as to

the amount of damages is not required but only that the evidence
formed a basis for a reasonable approximation by the trier of
fact.

Respondent submits that the lower court had all the

necessary evidence and made a reasonable approximation of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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damages incurred bv
- ~P~ as a result of Je_nson '-1estroving
business.
One final point is that t11e lower court's a\Jard of
$2,000 per year seer1s to be based on net earnings and not

gross earnings.

RP~

contends that said a1-1arc1. could h 1 •1e

been based on gross earnings of a:.:>proxiTT\atel•J $30,no0.00
per year.

This court in the !1oc;an

case, ~ at p. 92,

stated in regard to ascertaining the value of loss of
business:
"A year's earnings, gross or net, cannot deter'1ine
dar1ages where agents solicit others to take the~
business a\vay fror1 their princinals in favor of sue'
agents, other"'ise agents eTT\::>lO'fed in a pri'1cionl's
banner year Might desiqnec1ly Pied Piper the custo:F
pay the profit for the past ye.ar, intenning to enjo:
a handsome re,vard for n'l.nv vears to coJYle, --a rathc~
ffiOUSY gesture UpOn IJhich COUrts frown."
The lower court was not bound to calculate the danaqe

~

RPT on net earnings and its deterl'lina tion of the af'\ounts
of $10,000.00 was not only extrenely conservative in
comparison to RPT' s gross ear nin<J s l::u t also a su:Jer harq:..
for the

$GO,OOO.OO business that Je,Json a.cr;uirecl.
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SU!1!1ARY

The present case is a case at law.

The lower court

evaluated the evidence and made its findings.

From those

findings it concluded that Jepson destroved RPT's physical
therapy business in Richfield through malicious and intentional
acts that were a breach of his fiduciarv duty.
The lower court had at least the three following
alternatives upon which to base its a1~ard of damages for loss
of profit:
l.

A breach of contract and fiduciary duty while an

employee.
2.

The unla•,Jful conversion and tortious taking of

confidential information and materials.
3.

The intentional destruction of

RP~'s

business

through unfair competition.
The case lav1 clearly supports the al'lard of damages for loss of
business when the lower court finds that t~e defendant's acts
were the proximate cause of said loss.

In the present case,

the lower cour had more than sufficient evidence before it to
support its findings of a breach of a fiduciary duty and
judgment of $10,000 for loss of business.
It is also clear from the record that the lower court
had before it all of the financial data of RPT's Richfield
Business for the period in ouestion and from said data made
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RPT's loss of business.
more.

The law does not reouire anything

The judgment of the lo~er court should he affir~~.
Resoectfull:; subnitted
RICENW S. ;m·•.SLIJI
455 East Fourth South
Suite 401
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Responde:·
CERTIFIC~~E

OF !niLING

/$"

hereb:/ certify that on the
day of February, 1978,
two CO!'yies of the I·Ji thin and foregoing Brief of Res"ondent,
Registered Physical Therapists, Inc., were served unon
Appellant by "1ailing to its attorney, 'l'ex R. Olsen, Attorne:·
at Law, 76 South ''uin Richfield, Utah, 84701.
I

0 3JJ)CA)L
~Chin\d S. ilenelka

AttorneY for Ap~ellant
Registered Physical 'Chera::
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